Lucker Manufacturing v. The Home Insurance Corp, Inc. by unknown
1994 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-12-1994 
Lucker Manufacturing v. The Home Insurance Corp, Inc. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994 
Recommended Citation 
"Lucker Manufacturing v. The Home Insurance Corp, Inc." (1994). 1994 Decisions. 14. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/14 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1994 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 








LUCKER MANUFACTURING, A UNIT OF  
AMCLYDE ENGINEERED PRODUCTS, INC., 
 
                 Appellant 
v. 
 
THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY 
 




On Appeal From the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 




Argued: October 26, 1993 
 
Before:  BECKER, ROTH, and LEWIS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed May 12, 1994) 
 
 
    ROBERT E. COUHIG, JR. (Argued) 
    Adams & Reese 
    4500 One Shell Square 
    New Orleans, LA  70139 
 
    THOMAS J. ELLIOTT 
    Elliott, Vanaskie & Riley 
    925 Harvest Drive 
    Union Meeting Corporation Center   
 #5 
    Third Floor 
    Blue Bell, PA  19422 
 




    WILLIAM T. SALZER (Argued) 
    CURTIS P. CHEYNEY, III 
    Swartz, Campbell & Detweiler 
    100 S. Broad Street 
    16 Land Title Building 
    Philadelphia, PA  19110 
 









BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 This is an appeal from summary judgment granted by the 
district court in favor of the defendant, The Home Insurance 
Company ("The Home") and against the plaintiff, Lucker 
Manufacturing, a Unit of Amclyde Engineered Products, Inc. 
("Lucker"), in an insurance coverage dispute arising under the 
diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  The appeal raises a 
question of interpretation of language that appears in the 
industry-wide, standard-form liability insurance policy known as 
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance ("CGL"):  does the 
clause "loss of use of tangible property that has not been 
physically injured" cover costs of preventing a defective 
component from becoming incorporated into a product that has been 
designed but has not yet been manufactured?   
 The product at issue here is an anchoring system made 
by Lucker for the off-shore oil drilling industry and called a 
Lateral Mooring System ("LMS").  Because of a defect that Lucker 
discovered in a component of the LMS -- castings manufactured by 
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Milwaukee Steel Foundry, a division of Grede Foundries, Inc. 
("Grede") -- Lucker was forced to increase the number of safety 
precautions in the manufacturing process for the LMS.  The 
increased precautions ensured that the castings incorporated into 
the LMS would not be defective.  When Lucker sued Grede for these 
costs, The Home, Grede's insurer, asserted that these costs were 
not covered by the policy, and refused to defend or indemnify 
Grede. 
 As part of a settlement agreement between Lucker and 
Grede, Grede assigned to Lucker any rights that it had against 
The Home for its failure to defend or indemnify.  Lucker then 
sued The Home.  The district court granted summary judgment for 
The Home because it believed that the additional safety 
precautions Lucker had to add to its manufacturing process did 
not represent a "loss of use" to Lucker of the LMS or LMS design, 
but rather represented a change in its customers' acceptance of 
the original LMS and LMS design.  Since this injury to Lucker did 
not constitute loss of use, the court held that The Home had not 
breached its duty to defend or indemnify Grede. 
 In our view, however, loss of use can and should cover 
the added costs of preventing a defective component from being 
incorporated into a product, even if those added costs were 
incurred because of a change in customer preferences.  As we 
discuss below, the distinction that the court drew between "loss 
of customer acceptance" and loss of use is arbitrary.  Liability 
for costs incurred because of a change in demand for a product in 
the marketplace brought about by the insured's wrongful act seems 
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to be precisely the type of liability that loss of use coverage 
was designed to protect against.  
 But the fact that the Lucker complaint adequately 
alleged a loss of use (and gets by summary judgment on that 
issue) does not end the inquiry because, under the CGL policy, 
the loss of use must have been to "tangible property."  When The 
Home withdrew coverage, it knew that the LMS itself had not 
physically existed at the time Grede's casting failed but was 
only in the design stage.  Lucker contends, however, that its LMS 
design, which did exist, was tangible property within the meaning 
of the policy.  We disagree because under current Wisconsin and 
Pennsylvania law, a system design like that of the LMS is not 
tangible property as that term is used in the standard form CGL 
policy.  Since an insurer has no duty to defend or indemnify 
claims that fall outside the coverage of the policy, The Home had 
no duty to defend or indemnify Grede.  Consequently, we will 
affirm the judgment of the district court. 
         
   I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 In 1989, Lucker contracted with Shell Oil Company to 
design and manufacture the LMS.  An LMS is, in essence, a huge 
permanent anchor.  It is fixed to the ocean floor and holds in 
place ships, oil platforms, and other large structures floating 
on the surface.  Among its components are "castings," large metal 
objects that attach to the ocean floor and hold the cables 
connected to the ship or platform.  Lucker purchased a number of 
these castings from a foundry in Milwaukee owned by Grede. Before 
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putting these castings into the LMS, Lucker decided to test their 
strength, and it arranged an "equipment load test" at Lehigh 
University.  Confident that the test would impress its customer, 
Lucker invited a Shell representative to watch.  The test, 
however, was a disaster.  To everyone's horror, a casting 
involved in the test suffered a catastrophic failure.  Had it 
been incorporated into the LMS and put into operation, Shell's 
ships and platforms would have floated off to sea.  So Shell told 
Lucker that, although it still wanted the LMS, Lucker had to 
maintain tighter control over the production and testing of the 
steel for the castings.  Lucker complied at a cost of $600,000. 
 At the time of the failure of the castings, the LMS was 
only in the design phase and had not yet been built.  After it 
completed the LMS, Lucker sued Grede on both tort and contract 
theories for the cost of compliance with Shell's instructions. It 
is undisputed that the castings were defective and that the 
defect was Grede's fault.  Grede had a CGL policy with The Home 
which insured it against any "property damage" Grede would be 
legally obligated to pay Lucker.  Although Lucker never claimed 
that the LMS was physically injured, physical injury was not a 
prerequisite of coverage.  According to the terms of the policy, 
"property damage" included "[l]oss of use of tangible property 
that is not physically injured."  Such a provision typically 
covers an interruption of income that is caused by a wrongful act 
not accompanied by physical injury.   
 The Home conditionally defended Grede during the early 
part of the lawsuit under a reservation of rights.  But when the 
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district court held that the tort claims sought purely economic 
losses which are not recoverable under Pennsylvania law and that 
Lucker could pursue its contract but not its tort claims, the 
Home withdrew its defense of Grede and disclaimed all liability 
under the policy.  In a letter to Grede, The Home claimed that 
contract-based economic damages were not loss of use of tangible 
property and that there was no basis for coverage.  In addition, 
The Home took the position that the losses were excluded by the 
"business risk," "failure to perform," and "sistership" 
exclusions in the policy.0 
 The dispute between Lucker and Grede eventually went to 
trial, and Lucker won a jury award of approximately $500,000.0 A 
few months later, Lucker and Grede settled the lawsuit:  Grede 
paid Lucker $600,000 and assigned to Lucker its rights against 
The Home to recover for defense costs and indemnification under 
the policy.  Standing in Grede's shoes, Lucker sued The Home 
claiming that The Home was in breach of both its duty to defend 
and to indemnify Grede, and that its breach was in bad faith. 
Both The Home and Lucker moved for summary judgment, agreeing 
that there were no factual disputes. 
 The district court granted summary judgment for The 
Home.  Lucker Mfg., Unit of Amclyde Engineered Prods., Inc. v. 
                     
0The business risk exclusion excludes from coverage damage to the 
castings; the failure to perform exclusion excludes from coverage 
non-physical injury to other property arising from a breach of 
contract unless the damage comes from a sudden and accidental 
injury; the sistership exclusion excludes from coverage the costs 
of inspection, repair, or replacement of the castings. 
0Whether the jury correctly found Grede liable for the costs 
Lucker incurred due to Shell's demands is not before us. 
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Home Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Pa. 1993).  The court held 
that The Home did not breach its duty to defend Grede because 
Lucker's complaint against Grede did not allege damages for "loss 
of use" of the LMS or LMS design, or for any other form of 
property damage covered by the policy.  Id. at 828.  It also held 
that The Home had no duty to indemnify Lucker because none of 
Lucker's damages fell within the policy's coverage.  Id. 
Additionally, it held that The Home did not act in bad faith. Id. 
at 830. 
 In deciding as it did, the court looked both to the 
language of the CGL policy and the language of the complaint 
Lucker had filed in its lawsuit against Grede.  The CGL policy in 
this case provided that The Home: 
will pay those sums that the insured [Grede] 
becomes legally obligated to pay because of 
"bodily injury" or "property damage" to which 
the insurance applies. 
 
The policy defined "property damage" as 
 
a. Physical injury to tangible property 
including all resulting loss of use of that 
property; or 
 




Lucker conceded that there had been no claim in the underlying 
action for actual physical injury to property other than the 
castings, which (it also conceded) were not covered by the 
policy.  Instead, it characterized its loss as one for damages 
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resulting from the loss of use of its own tangible property --the 
LMS design.0 
 In fending off the Home's claim that its pleadings were 
inadequate, Lucker contended that paragraphs 14-17 of its 
complaint potentially stated a claim for loss of use of the 
design of the LMS.  Paragraph 14 alleged that Shell had imposed 
stricter standards for the production and testing of the steel 
for the LMS; paragraph 15 alleged that Lucker had lost a 
competitive advantage in bidding on Shell projects and had 
sustained damage to its reputation; paragraph 16 alleged that had 
the castings not failed, the additional tests would not have been 
necessary; and paragraph 17 alleged that Lucker had suffered 
increased testing costs, increased costs in performing the Shell 
contract, lost profits, and lost future profits. 
 According to the district court, however, paragraphs 
14-17 merely averred that "due to the failure of the castings, 
[Lucker] could no longer sell the original LMS or LMS design to 
Shell because Shell imposed additional requirements; and it was 
the cost of complying with these additional requirements that 
Lucker sought to recover."  818 F. Supp. at 825 (footnote 
                     
0Lucker actually argued to the district court that it had lost 
the use of two things:  1) the LMS and 2) the design of the LMS. 
Because the district court decided there was no loss of use, it 
assumed that the LMS and LMS design both existed.  It appears 
from the record before us, however, that the LMS itself never 
existed, but was still in the design stage at the time the 
castings failed.  While the complaint potentially pled that the 
LMS itself existed, the record indicates that The Home knew these 
facts when it disclaimed coverage.  We believe that since the LMS 
was no more than a design at the time, Lucker's claims that it 
lost the use of the LMS and the LMS design actually claim the 
same thing -- loss of use of the design.    
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omitted).  Nowhere did Lucker claim that the LMS as designed 
could no longer perform its intended function because of the 
defect discovered in the castings.  Rather, Lucker acknowledged 
that the LMS as originally conceived could still hold floating 
objects in place, but argued that its "use" of the LMS design and 
the LMS was to sell the LMS to Shell and other customers, and 
that when it was forced to change the manufacturing process and 
the design, it lost the use of the LMS design.  Id. at 827. 
 The court rejected this argument: 
 There is no indication in the underlying 
complaint, either by inference or otherwise, 
that Lucker was ever unable, due to the 
failure of the castings or otherwise, to 
offer the original LMS for sale to Shell or 
to offer use of the original LMS design to 
other customers.  Lucker simply complained 
that when offered, Shell and perhaps other 
customers wanted something different because 
of the failure of the castings.  Thus Lucker 
did not allege a loss of an intended use of 
the original LMS as merchandise for sale or 
the original LMS design as a means of 
producing such merchandise; Lucker alleged a 
loss of expected customer acceptance of its 
product and design. 
 And loss of customer acceptance of a 
product or design is in no way the equivalent 
of "loss of use" of a product or design under 
the policy.  To equate the two would be to 
link CGL coverage to the vagaries of customer 
desire and make insurers of liabilities into 
guarantors of markets for goods and services. 
The CGL policy at issue here committed The 
Home to no such undertaking.  The Home 
contracted to defend and indemnify Grede for 
damages resulting from the loss of use of 
tangible property only. 
 
Id. at 828 (footnote omitted). 
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 On this basis, the district court granted summary 
judgment for The Home on the duty to defend issue.  Once it 
determined that The Home was not in breach of its duty to defend, 
its conclusions on the duty to indemnify and bad faith claims 
followed almost as a matter of course, and it granted The Home 
summary judgment on both of those issues.  Id. at 830.  This 
appeal followed.  Because the material facts are not disputed, we 
have plenary review of the district court's decision.  Pacific 
Indemnity Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 760 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
II.  CHOICE OF LAW 
 Faced with the possibility that either Pennsylvania or 
Wisconsin law apply to this diversity case, a choice of law 
question looms on the horizon.  Before a choice of law question 
arises, however, there must actually be a conflict between the 
potentially applicable bodies of law.  See Oil Shipping B.V. v. 
Sonmez Denizcilik Ve Ticaret A.S., 10 F.3d 1015, 1018 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Where there is no difference between the laws of the 
forum state and those of the foreign jurisdiction, there is a 
"false conflict" and the court need not decide the choice of law 
issue.  In re Complaint of Bankers Trust Co., 752 F.2d 874, 882 
(3d Cir. 1984) ("If the foreign law to which the forum's choice-
of-law rule refers does not differ from that of the forum on the 
issue, the issue presents a 'false conflict.'"); Lambert v. 
Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1114-15 (1st Cir. 1993) ("We need not 
resolve the [conflict of law] issue . . . as the outcome is the 
same under the substantive law of either jurisdiction."). 
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 Neither party has pressed a choice of law question on 
this appeal because neither has been able to identify any 
differences between Wisconsin and Pennsylvania law on the 
questions of an insurer's duty to defend and indemnify.  Our own 
research has not identified any relevant differences either.  As 
far as we can tell, the outcome of this lawsuit should be the 
same under either Wisconsin or Pennsylvania law.  Since there is 
no conflict of law under such circumstances, we will avoid the 
choice of law question.  Cf. Melville v. American Home Assur. 
Co., 584 F.2d 1306, 1311 (3d Cir. 1978) (warning courts to avoid 
dicta on conflicts questions when not put in issue).  We 
therefore will interchangeably refer to the laws of Wisconsin and 
Pennsylvania in discussing the law governing The Home's duty to 
defend and indemnify.0 
 
III.  THE DUTY TO DEFEND 
A. General Principles and The Pleading Question 
 Under the governing law, an insurance company is 
obligated to defend an insured whenever the allegations in a 
complaint filed against the insured potentially fall within the 
policy's coverage.  This duty to defend remains with the insurer 
until facts sufficient to confine the claims to liability not 
within the scope of the policy become known to the insurer.  See 
Imperial Casualty & Indem. Co. v. High Concrete Structures, Inc., 
                     
0The only real choice of law issue in this case involves the 
applicability of Pennsylvania's insurer bad faith statute, 42 Pa. 
C.S. § 8371.  We need not reach this issue given our resolution 
of the duty to defend and duty to indemnify questions. 
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858 F.2d 128, 131-32 (3d Cir. 1988); Sola Basic Indus., Inc. v. 
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 280 N.W.2d 211, 213 (Wis. 
1979) ("[I]t is necessary to determine whether the complaint 
alleges facts which, if proven, would give rise to liability 
covered under the terms and conditions of the policy."); Stidham 
v. Millvale Sportsmen's Club, 618 A.2d 945, 953-54 (Pa. Super. 
1992) (if indemnification depends upon the existence or 
nonexistence of disputed facts, the insurer has a duty to defend 
until the claim is narrowed to one patently outside the policy 
coverage). 
 Before considering whether a complaint is potentially 
covered by a policy, it is necessary to determine the coverage of 
the policy in the first instance.  In both Pennsylvania and 
Wisconsin (as in the majority of jurisdictions), the inquiry into 
coverage is independent of and antecedent to the question of duty 
to defend.0  See Erie Ins. Exch. v. Transamerica Ins. Co, 533 
A.2d 1363, 1368 (Pa. 1987) (first construing the terms of the 
policy, and then determining whether the complaint alleged facts 
which, if proven, would come within the scope of the policy as 
                     
0A minority of courts have held that where the question of 
coverage is an open question the insurer has a duty to defend. 
See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. National Computer Sys., 
Inc., 490 N.W.2d 626, 632 (Minn Ct. App. 1992) (where the 
question whether binders with confidential information in them 
were covered was an open one, the insurer had a duty to defend); 
see also Centennial Ins. Co. v. Applied Health Care Sys., Inc., 
710 F.2d 1288, 1291 (7th Cir. 1983) (applying California law, the 
court determined that the question whether information stored in 
a data processing system could be tangible property was 
irrelevant for purposes of determining the duty to defend because 
it was an unresolved question). 
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construed); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Good Humor Corp., 496 N.W.2d 
730 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (same). 
 Traditional principles of insurance policy 
interpretation control the inquiry into coverage.  The policy 
language must be tested by what a reasonable person in the 
position of the insured would have understood the words to mean. 
See Imperial, 858 F.2d at 131.  We must construe ambiguous 
language to provide coverage.  Id.  A provision is ambiguous if 
reasonable persons considering the relevant language in the 
context of the entire policy could honestly differ as to its 
meaning.  Id.; see also Harford Mutual Ins. Co. v. Moorhead, 578 
A.2d 492, 503 (Pa. Super. 1990) (the policy must unequivocally 
indicate coverage or non-coverage), appeal denied, 590 A.2d 757 
(Pa. 1991).  Nevertheless, a court should be careful not to 
create an ambiguity and, likewise, it should avoid rewriting the 
policy language in such a way that it conflicts with the plain 
meaning of the language.  Imperial, 858 F.2d at 131. 
 Once coverage of the policy is determined, the court 
then looks to the underlying complaint to see if it triggers 
coverage.  The underlying complaint need not track the policy 
language for there to be coverage:  under the liberal rules of 
notice pleading, Lucker's complaint needed only to indicate the 
type of litigation involved so that the defendant would have a 
fair notice of the claim and its defenses.  See First State 
Underwriters Agency of New England Reinsurance Corp. v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 803 F.2d 1308, 1315 (3d Cir. 1986); Ollerman v. 
O'Rourke Co., 288 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Wis. 1980); see also Western 
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Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Budrus, 332 N.W.2d 837, 839-40 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1983) (liberally construing a complaint to include a claim 
for loss of use of tangible property). 
 Thus, the fact that Lucker did not include the magic 
words "loss of use" or "tangible property" in its complaint does 
not relieve The Home of its duty to defend.  As the district 
court recognized, the complaint, reduced to its relevant 
essentials, averred that the failure of the Grede castings 
prevented Lucker from being able to sell the LMS design to Shell. 
Lucker, 818 F. Supp. at 825.  The main question in this appeal, 
then, is not whether there was adequate notice of such a claim, 
but rather whether, given traditional principles of insurance 
policy interpretation, such a claim is properly considered a 
claim for loss of use of tangible property.  With these general 
principles in mind, we discuss first the question whether 
Lucker's damages represented a loss of use of the LMS design.  We 
then turn to the question of whether the LMS design was tangible 
property. 
 
B.  Loss of Use 
 One of the two principal issues in this appeal --
whether the damages Lucker suffered because Shell wanted Lucker 
to beef up its quality control of the steel in the LMS are 
potentially "loss of use" damages as that term is used in the CGL 
-- turns on a conflict between the connotations of the term "use" 
on the one hand and the objectives of insurance on the other.  As 
has been mentioned, the district court agreed with The Home that 
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a "loss of use" within the meaning of the CGL form contract does 
not occur when a customer demands from the injured party added 
safeguards in the manufacturing process after a defect in the 
insured's product is discovered. 
 Critical to the district court's decision that Lucker's 
damages were not from a "loss of use" was the fact that Lucker 
never claimed that the LMS design could not work after the 
castings had failed at the Lehigh test.  In the court's view, the 
failure of the castings merely had the undesirable consequence of 
"reducing the acceptability of the LMS and LMS design to Shell." 
Lucker, 818 F. Supp. at 826 n.12.  Apparently, the district court 
saw a distinction between the loss of the ability to physically 
use the LMS design and the loss of the ability to sell the LMS 
design.  One was use and the other was non-use.  Cf. Eljer Mfg. 
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1646, 123 L. Ed.2d 267 (1993) 
(discussing physical injury in the context of CGL standard 
policies). 
   In everyday English, the district court's distinction 
makes sense.  The term "use" conjures the idea of some kind of 
physical application of property, as when a carpenter uses a 
hammer.  If someone does not want to buy the hammer but it can 
still pound nails into wood, the hammer can still be "used." That 
a customer does not want to buy it has no effect on its 
usefulness.  But such a distinction has little to do with the 
objectives of parties to insurance contracts.  See Eljer Mfg., 
972 F.2d at 809.  As we see it, the focus of the insurance 
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coverage determination should be on whether a customer's 
unwillingness to use a hammer, regardless of whether it is 
physically possible to use the hammer, is a type of lost use for 
which a risk-averse business pays its premium.  "Ordinary 
language" interpretations of phrases are not the only plausible 
interpretations of insurance contracts, especially when the 
contract is between sophisticated business entities.  It is 
important to ask what function "loss of use" was intended to 
perform in a CGL policy before relying on a common sense or lay 
distinction between physical use and other uses.  See Erie Ins. 
Exch., 533 A.2d at 1367 (stating that the term "use" must be 
considered with regard to the setting in which it is employed). 
 The 1966 version of the CGL defined "property damage" 
as "injury to or destruction of tangible property."  Yet cases 
interpreting that policy often afforded coverage for non-physical 
injuries, like diminution in value.  On the other hand, a number 
of cases excluded injuries where there was no physical contact 
between the injurer and the property injured.  See Sola Basic, 
280 N.W.2d at 214-15 (citing cases).  In 1973, the CGL policy was 
revised to clear up these internal tensions.  The new CGL policy 
replaced the old definition of property damage with the two-part 
definition contained in the policy involved in this case.  The 
first part repeats the old definition, except that the word 
"physical" is put before "injury."  The second part is the "loss 
of use" definition, which covers injury which is not physical 
because the insured's property does not physically contact that 
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of the injured party.  The revised language, then, allows 
coverage for both physical and non-physical injuries.0 
 Of course, Lucker did not suffer physical injury to the 
LMS (since it did not exist) or the LMS design.  Nor did it lose 
the physical use of the LMS or LMS design.  Indeed, Lucker could 
still have manufactured it and offered it for sale, and, even 
according to Lucker, the original LMS design would still have 
worked properly.  Nevertheless, Lucker did lose the economic use 
of the original LMS design:  because of the defective castings, 
Shell was no longer willing to buy the product, and Lucker could 
no longer use the LMS design as a source of income. 
 The question in this case, therefore, reduces to 
whether the lost "use" has to have been a lost physical use of 
the property, or whether it can also include a lost non-physical 
or economic use of the property.  The district court thought that 
loss of use should cover only lost physical use, and that 
customer acceptance simply was not a "use."  Lucker, 818 F. Supp. 
at 828.  We believe, however, that both the purposes behind 
liability insurance and the case law interpreting liability 
insurance suggest that the loss of a non-physical use of a 
product, such as offering it for sale, should be considered a 
                     
0The classic example of a loss of use injury is a case in which a 
manufacturer of construction cranes sells a defective crane which 
collapses in front of a restaurant, thereby impairing the 
restaurant's income.  If the restaurant sues the manufacturer and 
recovers the lost income, the manufacturer would be covered by 
the "loss of use" component of the CGL policy.  See Eljer, 972 
F.2d at 810; George H. Tinker, "Comprehensive General Liability 
Insurance -- Perspective and Overview," 25 Federation of Ins. 
Counsel Q., 217, 232 (1975).  
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"loss of use"; and that the decreased value of a product because 
of loss of customer acceptance of the product is a "loss of use" 
within the meaning of the standard CGL policy. 
 We test our understanding against the baseline case for 
both parties, Sola Basic.  In Sola Basic, 280 N.W.2d at 211, the 
insured was sued when a transformer it had manufactured for use 
in an electrical steel furnace owned by Thunder Bay Manufacturing 
was damaged by the insured's employee who had been sent to repair 
the transformer.  Id. at 212-13.  Because of the damage to the 
transformer, Thunder Bay could not operate the furnace.  The 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that Thunder Bay's loss of use of 
the furnace was a covered loss.  Id. at 217. 
 Sola Basic suggests that the use of a product as 
merchandise for sale or as a means of production is a "use" 
within the meaning of a CGL form policy.  In real terms, such a 
loss of use affects the injured party's ability to supply a 
product.  In Sola Basic, demand for Thunder Bay's product 
remained the same, but its ability to supply its product -- that 
is, to supply the product at a competitive price -- was impaired 
because the furnace could not work.  It is as if the supply curve 
was suddenly shifted to the left due to the negligence of the 
insured, and the liability insurance loss of use concept made up 
the difference.0 
                     
0Another way to think of Sola Basic is by viewing the furnace as 
an income stream.  When the furnace was shut down, Thunder Bay 
was deprived of the income stream from the furnace for the period 
it was inoperative.  That loss was lost use and was within the 
scope of the coverage. 
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 The district court accepted the Sola Basic decision as 
authority but distinguished it from this case because the change 
in customer acceptance did not affect the ability of Lucker to 
supply the product.  A change in customer acceptance is a change 
in the demand curve, not the supply curve.  Apparently, the court 
believed that the change in demand should be analyzed differently 
from a change in supply.  But it is not clear to us why this 
should be the case. 
 When a manufacturer supplies a defective product that 
injures a third party, the injury from that particular defect 
may, depending on the reaction of the injured third party, affect 
either the demand for the third party's goods or the supply of 
those goods.  Differing factors may influence whether the effect 
is on supply or demand.  For example the time of discovery of the 
defect is important.  If a manufacturer of enamel finishes 
produces a defective batch and sells it to a manufacturer of 
widgets, the discovery of the defect before the enamel is applied 
to the widgets will affect the supply of widgets the manufacturer 
has available to sell because production must be halted while new 
enamel finish is obtained.  If the discovery is made after the 
enamel is applied, the demand for widgets will be affected 
because customers won't want to buy widgets with blotchy 
finishes.  Another factor that may influence whether supply or 
demand is affected is the need of the widget producer to move 
merchandise.  He may decide he would rather sell blotchy widgets 
at a lower price in order to keep up cash flow.  The type of 
injury, whether caused by the widget producer's loss through 
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reduction in supply or in demand, may thus be beyond the control 
of the enamel finish manufacturer.  However, in purchasing CGL 
coverage, the manufacturer will want protection from liability 
for the widget producer's loss in either event.  For the same 
reason, if Grede were supplying steel to the widget producer, 
Grede would want CGL coverage whether the defective steel caused 
a reduction in supply because the production of widgets was 
halted or a reduction in demand because customers doubted the 
durability of widgets. 
 Consequently, a manufacturer worried about liability 
has no reason to see a difference in the type of coverage he has 
bought unless the insurance contract says otherwise, and the 
standard CGL insurance contract does not say otherwise.  CGL 
insurance appears to protect the insured from making up the 
difference in the injured party's revenue, regardless of whether 
the liability is for shifting supply or demand.  Therefore, 
coverage for both sorts of injuries appears to be within the 
reasonable expectations of the insured.   
 The relevant case law supports our view that no 
difference exists between coverage for wrongful acts that affect 
supply, and those that affect demand.  One case from this Court 
interpreting Pennsylvania law apparently held that a change in 
demand for a product may be considered a "loss of use."  See 
Imperial Casualty, 858 F.2d at 128.  In Imperial Casualty, 
Keystone, a manufacturer of washers, had a contract with Nice 
Bearing Company to supply it with a special kind of washer.  Id. 
at 130-31.  Keystone bought special steel from High Concrete to 
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make the washers.  Id.  Nice discovered that Keystone's washers 
were defective and rejected them.  Id.  Apparently the steel High 
Concrete had supplied was defective.  Id.  Keystone then sued 
High Concrete for breach of warranty, seeking "loss of use" 
damages in the form of lost profits and other incidental charges, 
including added freight charges.  Id. at 135.  This court held 
that these damages were potentially recoverable under High 
Concrete's CGL policy as "loss of use."  Id. at 135-36. 
 In Imperial, we allowed recovery for loss of use 
despite the fact that Keystone could have produced all of the 
washers made from the defective High Concrete steel that it 
wanted.  Nothing stopped Keystone from supplying washers made 
from the High Concrete steel except for the fact that its 
customer refused to accept them.  As in this case, a change in 
customer acceptance of the product caused the loss of use to 
Keystone, which had no use for the product other than selling it. 
To the extent there was a loss of use, it had to have been that 
Keystone's lost ability to sell the product was due to decreased 
demand.  The Home's attempt to distinguish Imperial on the ground 
that in Imperial there was physical injury to the washers does 
not change the fact that this Court found a loss of use that was 
attributable solely to a change in customer acceptance of the 
product. 
 The cases upon which The Home relies do not 
specifically address the contours of the loss of use provision. 
The Home relies on McDowell-Wellman Eng'g Co. v. Hartford Acci. & 
Indem. Co., 711 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1983), and Trio's, Inc. v. 
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Jones Sign Co., 444 N.W.2d 443 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), for the 
proposition that loss of use does not include the type of loss 
Lucker suffered.  In each case, the insured's product failed 
(McDowell-Wellman involved an ore bridge0 and Trio's involved a 
restaurant sign) and the insured incurred liability for a number 
of costs associated with the product's failure.  In McDowell-
Wellman the costs included the expenses incurred to keep the 
steel plant operational without a functional ore bridge, and in 
Trio's the costs included lost revenues for the time the 
restaurant went without a sign.  Although the courts denied 
recovery for those costs in both cases, neither court did so 
because there was no loss of use.  Rather, in both cases the 
courts thought that the costs recovered represented loss of use 
of the insured's product, costs which the policies specifically 
excluded from coverage.  McDowell-Wellman, 711 F.2d at 526-27; 
Trio's, 444 N.W.2d at 444-45.0  Because both cases were decided 
on the basis of policy exclusions, and not on the basis of loss 
of use, they are inapposite. 
                     
0An ore bridge is part of a system in a steel plant that carries 
raw materials to a blast furnace for processing. McDowell-
Wellman, 711 F.2d at 523. 
0 Both McDowell-Wellman and Trio's are essentially cases about 
allocating damages between the loss of use of the malfunctioning 
component and loss of use of the other property.  Both employ a 
sort of "but for" causation approach to deny coverage:  "but for" 
the malfunctioning ore bridge, the steel company would not have 
incurred the additional costs; and "but for" the malfunctioning 
sign, the restaurant would have lost no revenues.  Such an 
approach essentially reads the term "loss of use" right out of 
the policy.  Whenever there is a malfunctioning component, all 
loss of use of other property is caused at some level by the 
malfunctioning product or else there would simply be no injury 
due to the insured's product to which liability may attach. 
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 Apparently at the heart of the district court's opinion 
in this case was a fear that allowing coverage for Lucker would 
link insurance coverage to the "vagaries of customer desire" and 
turn liability insurers into "guarantors of markets for goods and 
services."  Lucker, 818 F. Supp. at 828.  That fear in the 
context of this case is exaggerated:  the loss of use provision 
is triggered only when the change in preference is due to the 
insured's wrongful act, and obviously not all changes in customer 
preferences are due to an insured's wrongful act.  To be sure, 
identifying the cause or magnitude of damages due to changes in 
customer preference might prove difficult in some cases, but 
substantive principles of tort and contract law account for such 
difficult inquiries with doctrines that shield defendants (the 
insureds) from liability where appropriate.  For example, the 
economic loss doctrine, by denying recovery under the rubrics of 
duty and probable cause, protects defendants from unanticipated 
plaintiffs and disproportionate liability.0 
 Even though reasonable minds may disagree with our 
construction of the language, the language is, at the very least, 
reasonably susceptible to more than one construction from the 
viewpoint of the insured and is therefore ambiguous.  Since under 
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin law we must resolve any ambiguity in 
                     
0Concerns about vastly increased liability are not at all 
implicated in this case.  Quite to the contrary, when Lucker 
replaced the castings and added safeguards so that faulty 
castings would not be installed in the LMS, it was mitigating the 
consequences of Grede having supplied it with a defective 
product.  It was thus curtailing rather than expanding potential 
liability. 
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favor of coverage, we hold that loss of use includes the loss of 
customer acceptance that Lucker suffered in this case.  
 
C.  Tangible Property 
 We need not reverse, however, if the LMS was not 
tangible property within the meaning of the insurance contract. 
Although the underlying complaint may have potentially alleged 
that the LMS existed as a tangible entity, at the time The Home 
disclaimed coverage for Lucker's complaint against Grede it was 
apparent that the LMS itself was not tangible at the time the 
castings failed. 
 The LMS design did exist, however, and the complaint 
potentially pled that Lucker had lost the use of its design after 
the castings had failed.0  Thus, we must determine whether a 
design is tangible property as that term is used in a CGL.0  We 
                     
0The LMS designs and plans existed prior to the catastrophic 
failure of Grede's product.  They were used previously in 
AmClyde's Placid Oil Project, the Conoco Project, and the Akashi 
Bridge Project in Japan.  The existence of the design was also 
apparent from the complaint. 
0The Home has argued vigorously that since the underlying 
complaint sought only loss of profits and other economic losses, 
Lucker was not seeking damages for loss of use of tangible 
property.  Economic harms, The Home argues, are simply not 
tangible.  While such an observation may be correct, it 
misunderstands the nature of the losses Lucker was seeking from 
Grede.  Lucker was not seeking compensation for economic losses 
qua economic losses; rather, Lucker was pointing to its economic 
losses as a proxy for the value of the lost use of its LMS 
design.  Even the cases on which The Home relies recognize that 
an intangible economic loss, such as the diminution of value of a 
fixed asset, is recoverable if it provides a measure of damage to 
the tangible property.  See Liberty Bank of Montana v. Travelers 
Indem. Co., 870 F.2d 1504, 1509 (9th Cir. 1989); Giddings v. 
Industrial Indem. Co., 112 Cal. App. 3d 213, 219, 169 Cal. Rptr. 
278, 281 (1980) (a complaint seeking to recover for economic 
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conclude that the language of the policy, analogous case law from 
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, and case law from other jurisdictions 
compel the conclusion that the term tangible property does not 
include non-tangible property like system designs. 
 Under Pennsylvania and Wisconsin law, tangible property 
is property that can be felt or touched, or property capable of 
being possessed or realized.  In re Estate of MacFarlane, 459 
A.2d 1289, 1291-92 (Pa. Super. 1983); see also United States 
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Barron Indus., Inc., 809 F. Supp. 355, 
360 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (the term tangible in a CGL covers things 
which are physical -- capable of being touched and objectively 
perceivable); Holsum Foods, Div. of Harvest States Coop. v. Home 
Ins. Co., 469 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (similar 
approach). 
 In contrast, intangible property is defined as property 
that does not have intrinsic value but which is merely 
representative or evidence of value, like stock certificates. 
MacFarlane, 459 A.2d at 1292; Barron Indus., 809 F. Supp. at 360 
(under Pennsylvania law CGL policy does not cover intangible 
property, such as property that represents value but has no 
intrinsic marketable value of its own (e.g., stock, investments, 
                                                                  
losses "falls within the scope of the insurance coverage only 
where these intangible economic losses provide a measure of 
damages to physical property which is within the policy's 
coverage") (internal quotation omitted).  In this case, Lucker 
lost the use of its LMS design.  The absorbed costs of beefing up 
its specifications for the steel in the LMS and the other costs 
it recovered from Grede are a proxy for the value of the lost use 
of the original LMS design.  As such, they are recoverable under 
the policy if the LMS design was tangible property. 
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copyrights, promissory notes); property regarded as intangible 
rights (e.g., goodwill and reputation); or economic interests 
(e.g., overhead, profits, investment value, and productivity)); 
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Commonwealth, 339 A.2d 912, 
918 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (natural gas is tangible property for 
tax purposes even though it cannot be felt because it is capable 
of being perceived as materially existent; "[i]ntangible 
properties in the law are such incorporeal rights as shares of 
capital stock, choses in action, copyrights and the like"), error 
dismissed, 350 A.2d 193 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975), rev'd on other 
grounds, 360 A.2d 592 (Pa. 1976); Palmolive Co. v. Conway, 43 
F.2d 226, 227 (D. Wis. 1930) (trademarks, trade secrets, and good 
will not tangible property), aff'd, 56 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1932), 
cert. denied, 287 U.S. 601, 53 S. Ct. 8, 77 L. Ed. 524 (1932); 
American Tel. & Telegraph Co. v. Department of Revenue, 422 
N.W.2d 629, 631 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (cash, shares of stock, 
notes, bonds, etc., not tangible as defined in tax statute).  But 
see Man, Levy & Nogi, Inc. v. School Dist. of Scranton, 375 A.2d 
832, 834 (Pa. Commw. 1977) (insurance premiums are tangible 
property for tax purposes).0 
                     
0 The distinction between tangible and intangible 
property made by these cases tracks the definitions found in 
Black's Law Dictionary.  Black's defines tangible property as 
"property that has physical form and substance and is not 
intangible" and intangible property as "such property as has no 
intrinsic and marketable value, but is merely the representative 
or evidence of value, such as certificates of stock, bonds, 
promissory notes, copyrights, and franchises."  Black's Law 
Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). 
 Insurance companies reasonably might want to exclude 
coverage for damage to such intangible interests because 
estimating the potential liability for purposes of setting the 
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 Because these principles are so well settled, Lucker 
does not argue that the concept of the LMS is tangible property, 
for such an idea cannot be touched and is not materially 
existent.  Rather, Lucker contends that a design which is reduced 
to a tangible medium, like a blueprint or a computer disk, should 
be considered tangible property.  The Home, on the other hand, 
argues that where the real value of a design is in the idea, not 
in the physical plans that memorialize it, any loss in value of 
the design represents a loss in the value of the idea, which is 
not a loss of use of tangible property.  We believe that The 
                                                                  
premium might be very difficult, or even if the premium could be 
calculated, insuring against such liability might expose the 
company to such increased costs because of a great variance in 
liability that a CGL policy might become prohibitively expensive. 
It may also be that insurance companies are in no better position 
to insure against such losses than the insured.  For example, 
assuming that the stock is publicly traded, one can insure 
against changes in market price by purchasing options. 
 We note, however, that it is difficult to explain why 
liability for copyright or patent infringement would be included 
among the interests not covered by a CGL policy.  There is no 
obviously increased moral hazard problem (an insufficient 
incentive to be careful) with respect to copyright or patent 
infringement as compared to other types of injuries.  Nor does it 
appear to raise the possibility of huge liability, or liability 
that is difficult to calculate.  And it does not appear that the 
marketplace provides an efficient alternative to an insurance 
policy as it does with things like stocks. 
 Perhaps exclusion of coverage for copyright or patent 
violations can be explained by the fact that the CGL policy is a 
standard form and most customers of such policies are not as risk 
averse with respect to copyright and patent violations as they 
are with other types of tort damages and so they do not demand 
coverage for such injuries.  At all events, it appears sensible 
to presume that purchasers of liability insurance, who are 
principally concerned with more conventional forms of tort damage 
that their product may cause a third party, reasonably would be 
willing to bear the risk of loss to traditionally intangible 
interests in exchange for lower premiums. 
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Home's position is the one best supported by the relevant case 
law. 
 The Home principally relies on a taxation case from 
Wisconsin which held that the sale of computer keypunch cards was 
not a sale of tangible property for purposes of the Wisconsin 
sales tax.  See Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't 
of Revenue, 267 N.W.2d 656, 658-59 (Wis. 1978).  In Janesville, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that the information on the 
card, rather than the card itself, was the object of the 
transaction, and that, the tangible medium keeping the 
information was merely incidental to the transaction.  Id. 
Therefore, the court held, the sale of the keypunch cards was not 
a sale of tangible property.  Id.0 
 Lucker has cited no authority from the relevant 
jurisdictions.  Instead it has countered with a Minnesota case, 
Retail Sys., Inc. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 469 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1991), which held that a computer tape that stored 
information was tangible property covered under a liability 
policy, and a case from the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia, State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. 
                     
0The other case on which The Home places principle reliance, Gulf 
Insurance Co. v. L.A. Effects Group, Inc., 827 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 
1987), does not really advance The Home's position. In that case, 
L.A. Effects was sued by Twentieth Century Fox for failing to 
perform adequately in designing the special effects for the film 
Aliens.  Although L.A. Effects' argument that Fox's damages 
amounted to a loss of use of Aliens was rejected, Fox did not 
allege as damage any diminution in value to the film.  Id. at 
577-578.  Thus the issue presented here was not before that court 
and consequently that court did not hold that the loss of value 
of the film could not be loss of use of tangible property. 
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v. White, 777 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ga. 1991), which held that 
architectural plans in blueprint form were tangible property 
covered under a CGL policy. 
 Neither Retail Systems nor White extended the concept 
of tangible property as far as Lucker would have us do here, 
however.  In Retail Systems the court limited the coverage to the 
considerable value of the computer tape as a storage medium, 
disallowing recovery for the value of the data it stored. 
Similarly, in White, a case in which developers sought coverage 
for costs they incurred in converting architectural drawings, the 
district court recognized that the only recovery due the 
developers under the policy was for the value of the paper and 
ink, and not the value of the ideas the paper and ink embodied. 
777 F. Supp. at 954-55.  Both cases drew a sharp distinction 
between recovery for the value of a tangible medium storing 
ideas, and recovery for the ideas themselves.0  To the extent 
that the damage had been merely to the value of the idea, it was 
not damage to "tangible" property. 
 In this case, none of the losses Lucker sought from 
Grede represented a loss in value of the storage medium in which 
the design for the LMS was embodied or in the costs in reducing 
the design to blueprints or computer tape (e.g. the costs of 
                     
0Other courts have also seen such a distinction.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Rizzuto, 1980 WL 4637 (Mass. 
Super. 1980) (Commonwealth could not prosecute for theft a 
defendant that copied someone else's idea for a film because the 
idea, although reproduced in tangible form and capable of being 
reproduced into tangible form, was not itself tangible; 
distinction must be drawn between cause of value and thing of 
value). 
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having engineers draw up the plans for the system).  The recovery 
Lucker sought was for the loss of use of the design itself -- for 
the loss in usefulness of the original concept of the LMS.  The 
loss of use of this concept, however, was not loss of use of 
something which could be touched or felt.  For this reason, we 
hold that Lucker's loss of use of the LMS design was not loss of 
use of tangible property. 
 We note, however, that the "tangibility" limitation in 
the standard form CGL seems to be in tension with what we believe 
is its underlying rationale.  As far as we can tell, the CGL 
limits coverage to "tangible property" to avoid indemnifying the 
insured for any liability the insured faces for damage caused to 
stocks, bonds, copyrights and the like, items for which either 
the insurer is arguably in no better position to spread risk than 
the insured, or which would dramatically increase the premiums.0  
But by making "tangibility" the touchstone of coverage, the CGL 
excludes a significant class of property for which liability 
insurance reasonably could be provided --property like system 
designs or computer software. 
 The "tangibility" limitation was probably a reasonable 
way to separate insurable from non-insurable property interests 
in 1973 when the CGL standard policy was drafted.  But the 
tremendous increase in automation, and the concomitant increase 
in demand for intangible products like computer software and 
system designs during the past twenty years, has made such a 
                     
0See note 13 above. 
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limitation of questionable value.  As a matter of risk spreading, 
we see no qualitative difference between the need for insurance 
to protect a manufacturer from liability incurred because its 
product shuts down a furnace, damages a computerized billing 
system, or, as in this case, devalues a system design.0 
 Nevertheless, we are bound by the language of the 
policy, and we cannot stretch it to include non-tangible property 
like the LMS design.  Unlike "loss of use," which can plausibly 
be construed to include loss of customer acceptance, it would 
require too great a departure from the meaning of "tangible" to 
hold that a system design is tangible property covered under the 
policy.  Therefore, because the LMS design was not tangible 
property, there was no "property damage" and thus no coverage 
under the policy for Lucker's loss.  As a result, we agree with 
the district court that The Home did not breach its duty to 
defend Grede when it disclaimed coverage.0 
 
IV.  THE DUTY TO INDEMNIFY  
  In light of our holding on the duty to defend, we may 
dispose of the duty to indemnify summarily.  An insurer has a 
duty to indemnify its insured only if it is established that the 
insured's damages are actually within the policy coverage. 
                     
0A preferable way to approach the problem might be for the 
insurer to eliminate the overbroad "tangibility" requirement from 
the definition of property damage and instead specifically 
exclude traditional intangible property interests, like stocks, 
copyrights, or goodwill. 
0Because we hold that there was no "property damage," we need not 
construe the policy's exclusions. 
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Safeguard Scientifics v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 766 F. Supp. 324, 
334 (E.D. Pa. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part without 
opinion, 961 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1992).  Lucker recovered from 
Grede as a result of the jury verdict:  1) $32,934 for the actual 
cost of the castings; 2) $200,007 in "Test Project Costs"; and 3) 
$251,337 for "Costs Absorbed to reproduce Shell's casting to a 
higher specification."  Lucker cannot recover any of these costs 
because neither the LMS nor the LMS design was tangible property, 
and hence there was no property damage covered by the policy.0    
 The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
                     
0Because we find that The Home was in breach of neither its duty 
to defend nor its duty to indemnify, it did not act in bad faith 
and did not violate 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371.  
